RC125 JulyAug 2026 - Magazine - Page 15
What they share is a common dependency that receives
far less attention. Every vessel must berth, service, and
operate from shore infrastructure that is, in many cases, signi昀椀cantly older than the 昀氀eet it supports. Jetties,
wharves, and marine terminals across the federal estate
are themselves subject to major capital programs. The cost
estimates underpinning those programs are developed
using frameworks that were designed for a di昀昀erent class
of infrastructure. The result is not an isolated delivery
issue, but a recurring pattern of structural underestimation
that is increasingly visible where federal program outcomes have reached the
public record.
A federal jetty is not a building
beside water
When a senior executive approves an
early estimate for a conventional o昀케ce
building, the method behind that number
is well established. Cost benchmarks are
available; allowances and contingencies
are broadly calibrated, and the range
of likely outcomes is reasonably well
understood. While uncertainty remains,
its scale and drivers are familiar.
Federal marine projects operate
under di昀昀erent conditions. Marine cost
estimates are shaped by categories of
work that have little direct equivalent
in land-based infrastructure: subsea
rock drilling and blasting; dredging
and disposal of seabed sediments, often
contaminated and sometimes requiring
long-distance disposal routes; engineered
residual-risk capping; extensive turbidity
and silt control; deep piling through
variable seabed conditions; and specialist
corrosion-protection systems designed for
decades of exposure. These sit alongside
bespoke fendering and mooring systems,
engineered for speci昀椀c vessel classes and
load cases, and delivered within tight
seasonal and environmental windows by
a limited pool of specialized contractors.
For experienced marine contractors,
these conditions are well understood.
For cost-planning frameworks calibrated
on vertical and horizontal construction,
they often remain implicit. When such
risks are absorbed into generic percentage
allowances early in the project lifecycle, estimates tend
to under-reserve in systematic ways. In this context, a
昀椀fteen percent contingency on a $500 million marine
program may appear prudent, but it is rarely su昀케cient.
The estimate reflects the requirement it serves
Federal marine projects also exhibit a second, less visible
vulnerability. A jetty estimate is not simply an estimate of
a structure; it is an estimate of infrastructure con昀椀gured to
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support a de昀椀ned set of vessels. Changes in vessel length, displacement, power demand, or mooring con昀椀guration translate
directly into changes in jetty length, deck loading, fendering,
utilities, and dredging scope—with material cost consequences.
This tight coupling between 昀氀eet speci昀椀cations and shore
infrastructure creates a recurring governance challenge:
operational requirements are often still evolving when
infrastructure cost estimates are locked. The 2014 audit of
the A and B Jetty Recapitalization Project at CFB Esquimalt,
published by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review
Services) and available on the public record, illustrates this
dynamic. The audit found that the project’s Statement of
Operational Requirements was internally inconsistent on
whether the new jetties were required to accommodate
future Canadian Surface Combatants or merely to take
them into consideration—a distinction with signi昀椀cant
downstream cost implications. It also noted inconsistency
in departmental guidance on allowances and contingency,
making divergent risk pricing outcomes possible across
similar projects.
These 昀椀ndings are not a critique of teams delivering the
work. They re昀氀ect the planning and governance context in
which federal marine programs operate. The same conditions recur across multiple portfolios, particularly where ambitious operational requirements intersect with early-stage
estimating frameworks not tailored to marine assets.
Where cost pressure typically emerges
Public-sector cost overruns are often attributed to construction-phase challenges: unforeseen ground conditions,
adverse weather, or contractor performance. While these
factors play a role, they rarely explain the full gap between
early estimates and 昀椀nal outturns on federal marine projects.
More often, that gap was established years earlier.
There are three recurring mechanisms, the 昀椀rst of which
is the evolution of requirements. As 昀氀eet programs mature,
vessel speci昀椀cations change. Unless those changes are
promptly reconciled with dependent infrastructure projects,
estimates quickly fall out of alignment. By the time rebaselining occurs, the delta is often substantial, and the
governance and reputational barriers to revisiting approvals
are high.
The second mechanism is the treatment of marine-speci昀椀c
risk. Below-water geotechnical uncertainty, contaminated
sediment volumes, environmental work-window constraints,
and specialist contractor availability all carry uncertainty
pro昀椀les that are wider and more asymmetric than those
typically encountered on land. When priced as generic
contingencies rather than discrete, explicit risk categories,
these drivers are routinely under-represented—and their
interactions can compound cost pressure rather than o昀昀set it.
The third mechanism is schedule, as Marine programs
are particularly vulnerable to delay, and delay translates
directly into cost escalation. Seasonal access constraints,
permitting cycles, Indigenous consultation commitments,
and limited specialist capacity make schedule recovery more
di昀케cult than on many land-based projects. Estimates built
on schedules the project cannot realistically maintain tend to
be corrected later, and at scale.
JULY/AUGUST 2026 – RENEW CANADA 15
